Evolutionary spatial games with mean-field interactions

ORAL

Abstract

We introduce a mean-field term to an evolutionary spatial game model.
Namely, we consider the game of Nowak and May, based on the Prisoner's
dilemma, and augment the game rules by a mean-field term. This way,
the agent operates based on local information from its neighbors and
non-local information via the mean-field coupling.
We simulate the model and construct the steady-state phase diagram,
which shows significant differences due to the mean-field term.

Presenters

  • Dmitriy Antonov

    • National Research University Higher School of Economics

Authors

  • Dmitriy Antonov

    • National Research University Higher School of Economics
  • Evgeni Burovski

    • Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
    • National Research University Higher School of Economics
  • Lev Shchur

    • Landau ITP - Chernogolovka
    • Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics